How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article Ii of the Constitution by Maggs, Gregory E.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article Ii 
of the Constitution 
Gregory E. Maggs 
George Washington University Law School, gmaggs@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maggs, Gregory E., How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article Ii of the Constitution 
(2017). Gregory E. Maggs, How Justice Thomas Determines the Original Meaning of Article II of the 
Constitution, 127 Yale L.J. F. 210 (2017) http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-justice-thomas-
determines-the-original-meaning-of-article-ii-of-the-constitution; GWU Law School Public Law Research 
Paper No. 2017-60; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-60. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=3024280 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
210 
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
A U G U S T  2 ,  2 0 1 7  
How Justice Thomas Determines the Original 
Meaning of Article II of the Constitution  
Gregory E. Maggs
introduction 
The scope of the President’s powers under Article II of the Constitution has 
been a key topic during much of Justice Thomas’s twenty-five years on the Su-
preme Court. The attacks of September 11, 2001, for instance, prompted mili-
tary responses testing the inherent constitutional authority of the President and 
the extent to which other branches can limit this authority.1 Accordingly, no 
discussion of Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence over the past quarter century 
would be complete without a thorough understanding of how he approaches 
Article II questions. 
Justice Thomas has a well-known reputation for striving to decide constitu-
tional issues in accordance with the original meaning of the Constitution.2 This 
Essay concerns a specific question about this methodology in cases concerning 
presidential powers: How does Justice Thomas determine the original meaning 
of Article II of the U.S. Constitution? The answer to this question has both ac-
ademic and practical dimensions. The principal academic concerns are whether 
Justice Thomas’s approach is complete and logical and whether it accords with 
1. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (addressing the President’s inherent
constitutional power to establish military tribunals to try enemy combatants for war crimes
defined by the President); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (considering the Presi-
dent’s authority to detain suspected enemy combatants without bringing them before a fed-
eral judge or neutral tribunal).
2. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice
Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494 (2009) (discussing Justice Thomas’s originalism).
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his approach in other constitutional issues. The answer is practical because it 
reveals what kinds of arguments and sources persuade Justice Thomas. 
In this Essay, I seek to answer the question of how Justice Thomas deter-
mines the original meaning of Article II by making three observations based on 
opinions authored or joined by Justice Thomas. The Essay proceeds in two 
Parts. Part I discusses Justice Thomas’s typical approach to constitutional is-
sues. Part II then notes how his approach differs in Article II cases. 
i .  how justice thomas generally decides constitutional 
issues 
Justice Thomas has made clear that he generally strives to decide constitu-
tional questions in accordance with either the original meaning of the Consti-
tution or Supreme Court precedent.3 While much could be written on Justice 
Thomas’s views on precedent and stare decisis,4 my focus in this Essay is on his 
approach to original meaning. In recent cases, Justice Thomas has indicated 
that he looks for the original objective meaning of the Constitution and its 
amendments, as opposed to the original intent of the Framers who dra�ed 
them or the original understanding of the persons who voted to ratify them.5 
For example, in his concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,6 the decision that incorporated the Second 
Amendment against the states, Justice Thomas said: “When interpreting con-
stitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public understanding of a 
particular provision at the time it was adopted.”7 
Justice Thomas, however, does not limit his inquiry solely to evidence most 
demonstrative of the original objective meaning. On the contrary, Justice 
Thomas typically confirms this meaning by looking at a variety of sources more 
indicative of the original intent and original understanding. For example, he 
has cited the notes from the Constitutional Convention and the legislative his-
 
3. See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Because the Court’s holding is not supported by the original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment or any reasonable interpretation of our precedents, I respectfully dissent.”). 
4. See, e.g., John Eastman, Reflections on Justice Thomas’s Twenty Years on the Bench, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 691, 704 (2011) (comparing Justice Thomas’s and Justice Scalia’s treatments 
of precedent). 
5. In recent years, judges and scholars have recognized that the Constitution may have more 
than one original meaning, depending on how the term is defined. See Maggs, supra note 2, 
at 496-500. 
6. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
7. Id. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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tory of constitutional amendments, even though these sources typically provide 
better evidence of the original intent than of the original objective meaning.8 
Similarly, he has cited the Federalist Papers and the records of the state ratifying 
conventions, even though these sources supply stronger evidence of the origi-
nal understanding.9 Justice Thomas theorizes that citing these sources can con-
firm the original meaning. For instance, in McDonald, Justice Thomas cited 
some of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining: 
“Statements by legislators can assist in this process [of determining the original 
public meaning] to the extent they demonstrate the manner in which the pub-
lic used or understood a particular word or phrase.”10 
Finally, Justice Thomas tends to focus on the meaning of individual words 
and phrases in the Constitution, rather than on abstract constitutional princi-
ples. For instance, in his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, a case addressing 
whether Congress can regulate guns near schools under the Commerce Clause, 
Justice Thomas primarily sought to determine what, “[a]t the time the original 
Constitution was ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of.”11 Similarly, in his concur-
rence in part and concurrence in the judgment in Utah v. Evans, a case consid-
ering whether the federal government could use approximations in a decennial 
census, Justice Thomas asked what, “at the time of the [F]ounding,” did the 
words “actual enumeration” mean?12 
In these cases, as in most of his cases, he did not delve into purposes, eco-
nomics, or political theories. He sought the definition of the words in the text 
of the Constitution. His general approach calls to mind a quotation by Antis-
thenes the Cynic, a Greek philosopher and proponent of Nominalism. Antis-
thenes was skeptical of abstractions as opposed to facts. “A horse I can see,” An-
tisthenes said, “but horseness I cannot see.”13 
A variety of historical documents can provide evidence of the original 
meaning of Article II’s provisions. Seven sources commonly cited by the Su-
preme Court include (1) the early state constitutions,14 (2) the Articles of Con-
 
8. See Maggs, supra note 2, at 509. 
9. See id.; THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED 
BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891). 
10. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 828 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
11. 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
12. 536 U.S. 452, 493 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
13. 8 SIMPLICIUS, COMMENTARIA IN ARISTOTELEM 208 (Charles L. Kalbfleisch ed., 1907). 
14. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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federation,15 (3) the notes from the Constitutional Convention,16 (4) the Feder-
alist Papers,17 (5) the records of the state ratifying conventions,18 (6) the rec-
ords of early presidential practice,19 and (7) dictionaries from the Founding 
Era.20 
Early state constitutions are o�en helpful because several provisions in Ar-
ticle II are directly modeled a�er them. For example, the Massachusetts Consti-
tution of 1780 made the Governor the “commander in chief of the army and 
navy” and gave him power to appoint judges and officers of the state.21 The Ar-
ticles of Confederation also can provide guidance because the Constitution spe-
cifically rejected many of that document’s flaws.22 In Freytag v. Commissioner, 
for instance, Justice Scalia considered the implications of moving the appoint-
ment power from Congress under the Articles to the President under the Con-
stitution.23 
The notes from the Constitutional Convention record what the Framers de-
cided when they discussed executive power for one day in May, eight days in 
June, nine days in July, eleven days in August, and seven days in September of 
1787.24 In addition, the dra�s prepared by the Convention’s Committee of Style 
 
15. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2104 (2015) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 204 
(1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (citing the Articles of Confederation). 
16. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 184 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936). 
17. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 691 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
18. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 774 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Weiss v. Unit-
ed States, 510 U.S. 163, 186 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). 
19. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2570 (2014); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 510 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
20. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Sw. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017); Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2104 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
21. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, ch. II, § 1, art. VII (1780). 
22. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for 
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397 (2017) (ex-
plaining how the Articles provide evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning). 
23. See Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 904 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment). 
24. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereina�er FARRAND’S RECORDS] (May 29); id. at 63, 64, 66, 68, 70 (June 1); id. at 74, 80, 
81, 88, 90 (June 2); id. at 96, 109, 113 (June 4); id. at 116, 119 (June 5); id. at 175 (June 9); 
id. at 224, 236 (June 13); id. at 244 (June 15); id. at 292, 300 (June 18); 2 FARRAND’S REC-
ORDS 29 (July 17); id. at 41 (July 18); id. at 52, 57 (July 19); id. at 61-63 (July 20); id. at 73, 
80 (July 21); id. at 95 (July 23); id. at 99, 102 (July 24); id. at 109 (July 25); id. at 116, 118, 
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and Committee of Detail reveal choices made in dra�ing Article II.25 In Myers v. 
United States, the Court looked carefully at the debates in the Convention be-
fore ruling on whether Congress could limit the President’s removal power.26 
Arguing for ratification of the Constitution in 1788, James Madison ad-
dressed the President’s powers in Federalist No. 42, John Jay discussed them in 
No. 64, and Alexander Hamilton considered them in Federalist Nos. 67-75.27 Par-
ticipants at the state ratifying conventions also made important comments 
about executive power.28 The Supreme Court has examined the Virginia ratifi-
cation debates when construing the President’s treaty power in Reid v. Covert.29 
Early presidential practice under the Constitution can provide clues about 
the original meaning of Article II based on the assumption that early presidents 
knew and followed the original meaning. For example, in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court observed that President Washington 
had asserted what would now be called the “executive privilege” in refusing to 
discuss diplomatic negotiations.30 And dictionaries from the Founding Era can 
provide evidence of the original objective meaning of key words in Article II.31 
For example, Justice Scalia looked up the meaning of “inferiour” in Samuel 
Johnson’s eighteenth-century dictionary when determining the meaning of “in-
ferior officer” in Morrison v. Olson.32 
 
121 (July 26); id. at 185-186 (Aug. 6); id. at 196 (Aug. 7); id. at 297 (Aug. 15); id. at 319 
(Aug. 17); id. at 328 (Aug. 18); id. at 335, 342 (Aug. 20); id. at 367 (Aug. 22); id. at 389, 395 
(Aug. 23); id. at 401, 404, 405 (Aug. 24); id. at 411, 418, 419, 420 (Aug. 25); id. at 426, 427 
(Aug. 27); id. at 494, 495, 497, 499 (Sept. 4); id. at 511 (Sept. 5); id. at 521 (Sept. 6); id. at 
535, 538, 541 (Sept. 7); id. at 547, 553 (Sept. 8); id. at 564 (Sept. 10); id. at 626-27, 636, 638-
39 (Sept. 15). See generally PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDER’S CONSTI-
TUTION §§ 2.2.1-3, 2.3 (2001) (identifying these excerpts from the records of the Constitu-
tional Convention). 
25. See id. at 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS 132, 134-136, 143, 145, 146, 155, 157, 158, 169, 171, 172 (Com-
mittee of Detail); id. at 572-575, 598-600 (Committee of Style). 
26. 272 U.S. 52, 110 (1926). 
27. For background concerning the Federalist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to 
the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
28. For background concerning the state ratification debates, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise 
Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the 
United States Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457. 
29. 354 U.S. 1, 15 & n.32 (1957) (stating that the Treaty Power does not permit the “prohibitions 
of the Constitution . . . [to] be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate 
combined”). 
30. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
31. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era To Deter-
mine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014). 
32. 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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i i .  three observations regarding how justice thomas 
determines the original meaning of article i i ’s  
provisions 
Although known for his usual silence during oral argument, Justice Thom-
as is the most prolific writer of the current members of the Supreme Court. 
Last year, for example, Justice Thomas wrote almost twice as many opinions as 
any of his colleagues.33 His extensive collection of utterances on Article II facili-
tates an evaluation of his methodology. My three observations are (1) that Jus-
tice Thomas has a greater inclination to theorize about the nature of executive 
power under Article II than about other features of the Constitution; (2) that 
he relies on all of the most commonly cited historical sources when discerning 
the original meaning of the Constitution; and (3) that he looks primarily for 
the original objective meaning of Article II, rather than some other type of orig-
inal meaning (such as the original intent of the Framers or the original under-
standing of the participants at the state ratification conventions). 
A. Observation No. 1: A Greater Inclination to Theorize 
Justice Thomas seems much more inclined to theorize about executive 
power than other aspects of constitutional law. As explained above, Justice 
Thomas usually focuses on specific questions about the meaning of individual 
words in the Constitution. He typically finds answers in dictionaries from the 
Founding Era and similar sources, and tends to eschew abstract constitutional 
arguments. But when interpreting Article II, he tends to move beyond the text 
and into the realm of theory. 
For example, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,34 Justice Thomas made the nature of 
executive power the focus of his dissent. That case concluded that the President 
alone could not decide whether to detain a U.S. citizen captured on the battle-
field while fighting for the enemy. In his analysis, Justice Thomas did not just 
look at the words of Article II, but instead considered principles of constitu-
tional competence and authority. In his dissent, he wrote: “The plurality’s evi-
dent belief that it is qualified to pass on the ‘military necessity’ . . . of the 
Commander in Chief’s decision to employ a particular form of force against 
our enemies is so antithetical to our constitutional structure that it simply can-
 
33. See The Statistics, 130 HARV. L. REV. 507, 507 (2016) (indicating that Justice Thomas wrote 
thirty-nine opinions, while Justice Alito, the next most prolific author, wrote twenty). 
34. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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not go unanswered.”35 His conclusions about the residual foreign affairs pow-
ers in Zivotofsky v. Kerry36 are similarly broader than simply looking at the 
meaning of individual constitutional terms. In deciding that the President ra-
ther than Congress could determine the wording of U.S. passports, Justice 
Thomas reasoned that “the President is not confined to those powers expressly 
identified in [the Constitution].”37 
I see two possible explanations for this departure from Justice Thomas’s 
usual practice of seeing a horse but not seeing horseness. The first explanation 
is that Justice Thomas has concluded that Article I limits legislative power in a 
way that Article II does not limit executive power. The first sentence of Article I 
says that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States . . . .”38 In contrast, the first sentence of Article II contains no 
“herein granted” limitation; it says that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”39 In Zivotofsky, Justice Thomas 
explained that this distinction implies that the President has powers not enu-
merated in Article II: “By omitting the words ‘herein granted’ in Article II, the 
Constitution indicates that the ‘executive Power’ vested in the President is not 
confined to those powers expressly identified in the document. Instead, it in-
cludes all powers originally understood as falling within the ‘executive Power’ 
of the Federal Government.”40 
Because Justice Thomas has this understanding, his interpretation of Arti-
cle II is necessarily less textual than his interpretation of Article I. He must be 
less concerned with the historical meaning of specific words, and more con-
cerned with other kinds of arguments about what powers the Constitution 
originally assigned the President. In Zivotofsky, for example, he looked for evi-
dence of the public “understanding of executive power [that] prevailed in 
America” during the Founding Era.41 
A second explanation is that deciding Article II issues without resorting to 
theory is difficult due to the brevity of Article II’s text and the fact that many of 
its phrases appear to be terms of art. The President’s powers are given in the 
320 words of Article II, Sections 2 and 3. In contrast, Congress’s powers are de-
tailed in the 684 words of Article I, Sections 8 and 9. Even putting aside possi-
ble implications from the omission of the “herein granted” language, Article II 
 
35. Id. at 678 (Thomas J., dissenting). 
36. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 2098. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
40. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2098. 
41. Id. 
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simply contains much less detail. In addition, Article II uses compound 
phrases, such as “Commander in Chief” and “officer of the United States,” 
which would seem to have special meanings that would not appear in diction-
aries.42 Narrow textual analysis, accordingly, may seem insufficient to resolve 
issues arising under Article II. 
B. Observation No. 2: Reliance on Many Sources of Original Meaning 
Justice Thomas routinely cites all seven of the key sources of original mean-
ing that I have mentioned in his decisions on executive power. This observation 
may have practical significance for Supreme Court litigation. Parties who wish 
to persuade Justice Thomas in Article II cases should seek support in all of 
these sources. Though a full description of each of Justice Thomas’s majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions is beyond the scope of this Essay, an ex-
ample of his reliance on each source will demonstrate the point. 
In his recent opinion concurring in the judgment in Perez v. Mortgage Bank-
ers Association, Justice Thomas relied on early state constitutions and the Rec-
ords of the Federal Convention to determine the executive power to create binding 
interpretations of administratively promulgated regulations.43 The majority 
opinion in Perez had merely considered a question under the Administrative 
Procedure Act: whether an agency’s substantial revision of its interpretation of 
a regulation should be construed as an amendment of the regulation.44 Justice 
Thomas, however, thought it necessary to address larger questions of executive 
power and how the Framers were concerned about the weakness of separation 
of powers under state constitutions.45 
Justice Thomas relied on the Articles of Confederation in Zivotofsky v. Ker-
ry.46 In that case, the Court considered a federal statute that concerned persons 
born in Jerusalem. The statute required the State Department, upon request, to 
list the place of birth on the person’s passport as “Jerusalem, Israel” as opposed 
to just “Jerusalem.” The majority held that the statute violated the separation of 
powers because it interfered with the President’s exclusive power of diplomatic 
 
42. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2918952 [http://perma.cc/P3Z6-GPLP] 
(discussing the original meaning of “Officers of the United States”). 
43. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
44. Id. at 1203 (majority opinion). 
45. See id. at 1214 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
46. 135 S. Ct. at 2076. 
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recognition.47 Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. He con-
cluded that residual foreign affairs powers were vested in the President rather 
than in Congress, comparing the Articles of Confederation to the Constitu-
tion.48 
Justice Thomas relied heavily on the Federalist Papers in his dissents in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld49 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.50 In Hamdi, the question was 
whether the President could conclusively decide who was an enemy combatant 
subject to detention for the duration of a conflict.51 In Hamdan, the principal 
question was whether the President could establish military tribunals to try de-
tained enemy combatants for conspiracy to commit war crimes.52 In both cases, 
Justice Thomas saw support in the Federalist Papers for the proposition that the 
President had the primary responsibility to protect national security.53 
Justice Thomas cited the Virginia state ratification debates in his opinion 
concurring in the judgment in Bond v. United States.54 The case concerned the 
power of the President, with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties that 
would give the government additional powers beyond those enumerated in Ar-
ticle I, Section 8.55 In concluding that the President lacked this power, Justice 
Thomas cited both early presidential practice56 and four dictionaries from the 
Founding Era.57 
Reliance on these sources of the original meaning is not merely a matter of 
preference when writing his own opinions. Justice Thomas joins the opinions 
of other Justices that cite these sources but typically declines to join the ones 
that do not. One example is NLRB v. Noel Canning, which concerned recess ap-
pointments.58 In that case, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment in which he cited various sources of the original meaning of the term 
“recess.”59 Justice Thomas joined this opinion.60 But Justice Thomas pointedly 
 
47. See id. at 2096. 
48. See id. at 2102 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
49. 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
50. 548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J, dissenting). 
51. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion). 
52. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (majority opinion). 
53. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist Nos. 23, 34, 41); 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679, 691 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist Nos. 47, 70). 
54. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2102 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 2107. 
57. See id. at 2104. 
58. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
59. See id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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refused to join the entirety of the majority in Bank Markazi v. Peterson.61 In that 
case, the Court held that the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2012 did not violate 
the separation of powers. Justice Thomas refused to join only Part II-C of the 
Court’s opinion, which spoke eloquently about executive determinations of for-
eign sovereign immunity.62 But because it did not cite any of the sources of 
original meaning that Justice Thomas typically relies on, he did not agree with 
the arguments. 
This observation might be more interesting and possibly more useful if a 
review of the cases showed that Justice Thomas favored some sources more 
than others. Such a discovery might yield further insight into Justice Thomas’s 
views about the President’s powers or suggest what litigants should emphasize 
when trying to persuade Justice Thomas. But I could discern no such evidence. 
Justice Thomas considers all of the leading sources relevant and apparently has 
not weighted any of them more or less heavily. 
C. Observation No. 3: Search for the Original Objective Meaning 
In deciding questions under Article II, Justice Thomas adheres to his gen-
eral approach of seeking the original objective meaning. For example, as noted 
above, Justice Thomas in Zivotofsky announced that he was looking for the 
“understanding of executive power [that] prevailed in America” in the Found-
ing Era, rather than looking for the original intent of the Framers or original 
understanding of the participants at the state ratifying conventions. But Justice 
Thomas has not looked exclusively at the sources, like dictionaries, that best 
reveal that meaning. Instead, he confirms the original objective meaning by 
looking at other sources of the original meaning. Again, Bond v. United States 
presents an indicative example.63 In Bond, he cited both evidence of the original 
understanding as shown by the records of the ratification debates and the ob-
jective meaning shown in dictionaries. Litigants before the Court therefore 
should not overlook evidence that might bolster arguments that focus specifi-
cally on the original objective meaning of the Constitution. 
 
60. See id. 
61. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
62. See id. at 1316 n.*. 
63. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2102 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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i i i . conclusion 
Justice Thomas’s approach to executive power appears to be consistent with 
his general practice of looking for evidence of the original public meaning of 
constitutional terms and confirming that meaning with all pertinent historical 
sources. The practical conclusions from my observations are twofold. First, a 
litigator who hopes to persuade Justice Thomas in an Article II case should at-
tempt to find support in all seven of the historical sources discussed above. 
Second, the same litigator also should consider making arguments based on 
theories of executive power—such as those concerning the competence and au-
thority of the President compared to Congress and the Courts—even though 
Justice Thomas generally decides other kinds of constitutional questions with a 
focus more on the text of the Constitution than on abstract principles. 
 
Gregory Maggs is a Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law 
School. This paper was presented at a panel on Justice Thomas and Article II at the 
Yale Federalist Society’s conference, “Celebrating Justice Thomas: 25 Years on the Su-
preme Court.” I was a law clerk for Justice Thomas during the Supreme Court Octo-
ber Term 1991. My conclusions in this paper are based on my reading of Justice 
Thomas’s published opinions and not on any non-public information. I am very grate-
ful to the Yale Federalist Society for hosting the conference and inviting me to partici-
pate. 
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